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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, : Supreme Court No. 920114
v.

: Court of Appeals No. 900473-CA

C. DEAN LARSEN,

: Priority No. 14

Defendant/Petitioner. :
BRIEF OF PETITIONER
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
By its August 14, 1992, order the Utah Supreme Court
accepted certiorari review of this action.

The Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-22(5).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Is scienter—the intent to defraud, deceive or

manipulate—an element of the crime of securities fraud under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21?

A trial court's

interpretation of statutory law is reviewed for correctness.
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).
2.

Is expert testimony, concluding that an alleged

misrepresentation or omission is "material," inadmissible in a
prosecution for securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. § 61-11(2)?

While decisions to admit evidence are reviewed for "abuse

of discretion", "[wjhether a piece of evidence is admissible is a
-1-

question of lawf and we always review questions of law under a
correctness standard . • . . [I]t is possible that we might refer
casually to this standard of review as an 'abuse of discretion'
standard.

In fact, it is not."

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,

781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991) .
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1:
It is unlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21:
(1) A person who willfully violates any
provision of this chapter except Section 611-16, or who willfully violates any rule or
order under this chapter, or who willfully
violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the
statement made to be false or misleading in
any material respect, shall upon conviction
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
(2) No person may be imprisoned for the
violation of any rule or order if he proves
that he had no knowledge of the rule or
order.

-2-

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27:
This chapter may be so construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact
it and to coordinate the interpretation and
administration of this chapter with the
related federal regulation.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5"):
It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact.

-3-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This action involves a securities fraud prosecution
which raises a question of first impression in Utah:

Is

scienter—the intent to defraud, manipulate or deceive—an
element of the crime of securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. §§
61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21.

Under federal law on which these

provisions are patterned and with which Utah's Act was intended
to harmonize, it is.

The Utah Court of Appeals says it is not.

This appeal raises a second issue relating to the permissible
scope of expert opinion regarding the materiality of alleged
omissions in securities offering materials.

At trial, the

government was permitted, over objection, to present the "expert"
testimony of Sherwood Cook that certain facts allegedly not
disclosed to investors were "material."
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Court
of Appeals

The government charged Mr. Larsen with securities fraud
under the above provisions, alleging that he misrepresented or
omitted material facts in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of securities.

(Ct. App. Opinion at 4). 1

Mr. Larsen

asked the trial court to instruct the jury that an intent to

x

The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals issued
on February 7, 1992. A copy is attached as Appendix A. It was
published at 828 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
-4-

defraud is an element of the charges and that his good faith is a
defense.

(Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions Nos. 4-5, 30,

R. 1353-56, 1381, attached as Appendix B).
(Appendix B).

This was refused.

The jury was told instead that it is enough to

convict a person for securities fraud in Utah simply if he or she
acts "willfully":

"When it is his conscious objective or desire

to engage in the conduct or cause a result."

(Instructions to

the Jury, Nos. 14, 17 and 17A, R. 1309, 1312-13, Appendix C). 2
On June 20, 1990, the jury convicted Mr. Larsen.

On

February 7, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court, rejecting the view that intent to defraud is an element of
a criminal violation of §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-27.
Opinion at 13-14, Appendix A ) .

(Ct. App.

The Court of Appeals also found

that the trial court did not err in admitting Mr. Cook's
testimony.
C.

(Ct. App. Opinion at 10-11, Appendix A ) .
Statement of Facts

Facts necessary to review the issues appear in text.

2

The trial court granted a Certificate of Probable Cause on
March 4, 1991. The court expressed concern that specific intent
is an added element of securities fraud with which Mr. Larsen was
charged. (Transcript of Proceedings, February 19, 1991, pp. 4748, Appendix D ) .
-5-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Intent to Defraud is an Element of a
Violation of S§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21

The Court of Appeals decision that intent to defraud is
not an element of securities fraud under §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-121, collides with the interpretation of the related federal
provision, federal Rule X-10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5"), 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5, on which Utah's Act was patterned and with which
Utah's law was intended to harmonize.
27.

See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-

A violation of Rule 10b-5 requires such intent.

Consistently, good faith is a defense under Rule 10b-5.

Utah's

legislature intended § 61-1-1 to have the same interpretation.
Contrary to this intent, the Court of Appeals holding now permits
strict-liability conviction with possible imprisonment, as in
this case, without proof of this intent and regardless of the
actor's good faith belief.
2.

(Ct. App. Opinion at 13-14).

Expert Testimony on Materiality Under the
Securities Law is Improper

The trial court incorrectly admitted testimony of the
State's expert witness, Sherwood Cook, that certain facts Mr.
Larsen allegedly omitted from securities registration disclosure
documents were "material."

The Court of Appeals held that the

testimony was permissible because it went to "an ultimate issue
of fact."

In so ruling, the Court relied on vacated case

authority and misconstrued Rule 704 Utah R. Evid. which abolished

-6-

the "ultimate fact" rule.

The Court of Appeals' decision

conflicts with securities cases holding that expert testimony
like Mr. Cook's is inadmissible.
ARGUMENT
A.

Intent to Defraud is an Element of a Criminal
Violation of Sections 61-1-1(2^ and 61-1-21

Section 61-1-1(2), construed as intended by Utah's
legislature, in harmony with United States Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the related federal provision (Rule 10b-5)
on which § 61-1-1 was patterned, reveals that "scienter," (the
intent to defraud, manipulate or deceive)3 is an element of the
offense that the jury should have considered.
1.

Section 61-1-1 Was Patterned After Rule 10b-5

In 1963, the Utah Legislature adopted (with certain
revisions unimportant here) the Uniform Securities Act ("Uniform
Act").

This is known as the Utah Uniform Securities Act ("Utah

Act").

See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-28.

Section 101 of the Uniform

Act (§ 61-1-1 of Utah's Act) was patterned after Federal
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule X-10B-5 (Rule
10b-5).

See Uniform Securities Act § 101, Official Comment,

reprinted in Louis B. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities

3

The United States Supreme Court defined "scienter," an
element of a securities fraud violation under Section 10(b) and
Federal Rule lOb-5, as "a mental state embracing the intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 184, 193 n.12 (1976).
-7-

Act 6 (1976).

The language of the three classes of proscribed

activity under § 61-1-1 and Rule 10b-5 is identical.

Compare

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; pp. 2-3 supra.
Consistently, under both § 61-1-1 and Rule 10b-5, criminal
penalties are set for any "willful" violation/

Utah Code Ann.

§ 61-1-21; 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.
The State has incorrectly implied that Rule 10b-5 was
not the model for § 61-1-1 because the SEC, in drafting the rule,
drew language from § 17a of the Securities Act of 1933 ("the 1933
Act").

While language for Rule 10b-5 was borrowed from § 17a,

the intent of Rule 10b-5 was derived from § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), (not § 17a
of the 1933 Act), which empowered the SEC to act and which
provided the standard of liability that must be imposed.
U.S. at 200.5

425

Rule 10b-5 "was adopted pursuant to authority

granted the Commission under § 10(b) . . .to carry into effect

A

Mr. Larsen does not challenge the trial court's instruction
on "willfulness." (Instruction No. 17, Appendix C). Willfulness
is also an element of a § 61-1-1 violation. The trial court and
Court of Appeals erred by refusing to instruct that scienter was
a separate, additional element of the offence. See infra pp. 1018.
5

Congress fashioned standards of fault on a particularized
basis under the securities laws. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
200. "Ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the
standard of liability created by a particular section of the Acts
must therefore rest on the language of that section." .Id. Here,
the sole focus of inquiry is § 10(b) under which Rule 10b-5 was
promulgated. Congressional intent for other sections, such as
§ 17a of the 1933 Act, is thus irrelevant.
-8-

the will of Congress as expressed by the statute."
212-13).

(425 U.S. at

The Draftsmen's Commentary to § 101 of the Uniform Act

confirms that Rule 10b-5 was "the logical model" for a uniform
state fraud provision because of the language disparities in
existing state statutes and "because of the substantial body of
-judicial precedent which has been developed under the federal
provisions."

Louis B. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities

Act 7 (1976) (emphasis supplied).
This comment also reveals that the draftsmen
anticipated that adopting states would construe § 101 in harmony
with federal court interpretation of Rule 10b-5.

A prominent

commentator on Utah law (Professor Wallace Bennett) presumed that
federal and state court construction of like provisions would be
identical.
Utah;

See Wallace F. Bennett, Securities Regulation in

A Recap of History and the New Uniform Act, 1963 Utah L.

Rev. 216, 232 n.112 ("Similarity to the federal statute will
allow for interchangeability of judicial precedence in this
important area").
Utah's legislature expressed synonymous intent.

Aware

of the Utah Act's federal origin, Utah's legislature declared
that the Act was intended not only to encourage uniformity among
the states, but "to coordinate the interpretation and
administration of this chapter with the related federal
regulation."

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (emphasis supplied).

-9-

The

Utah Act must be construed to effectuate this "general purpose."
Id.
2.

Scienter is Required to Violate Rule 10b-5
and § 61-1-1

The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, the federal regulation
"related" to § 61-1-1, under authority of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act
which proscribes "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance" in contravention of SEC rules.
U.S. at 195.

See Hochfelder, 425

Section 10(b) was intended to address "practices

that involve some element of scienter . . . ."

425 U.S. at 201.

See also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 713 (1980) (Blackmun
concurring and dissenting).
state.

Rule 10b-5 requires the same mental

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212-14.

See also Dirks v. SEC,

463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983) ("[s]cienter--'a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud,' [citation
omitted]—is an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation"),
citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
U.S. at 695.

See also Aaron, 446

Plainly, proof of scienter is also required for a

criminal violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 which from
their genesis have been used for criminal prosecution (see 15
U.S.C. § 78ff) and later for a judicially-implied private cause
of action.

See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.

723, 730 (1975); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196. This is "the
interpretation" of § 61-1-1's "related federal regulation"
contemplated by the Utah legislature.
-10-

See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-

27; Payable Accounting Corp. v. McKinley, 667 P.2d 15, 17 (Utah
1983) (in construing Utah securities law, the Court relied on
federal case law interpreting the similar federal statute).
Thus, while the language of Rule 10b-5 (b) & (c), like
Utah's § 61-1-1(2) & (3), viewed in isolation, could be read to
apply to any type of material misstatement or omission,
intentional or not (the apparent basis of the Utah Court of
Appeals' holding), usuch a reading cannot be harmonized with the
administrative history of the rule."
212.

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at

"In the absence of a conflict between reasonably plain

meaning and legislative history, the words of the statute must
prevail."

Aaron, 446 U.S. at 700. The Utah legislature intended

that § 61-1-1 and Rule 10b-5 would be similarly construed.
3.

Good Faith is a Defense

Hand-in-hand with the scienter element is the
consistent notion that good faith is a defense under Utah's § 611-1 and Rule 10b-5.

Construing Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) of the

1934 Act, the Hochfelder Court explained that "[t]here is no
indication that Congress intended anyone to be made liable for
[manipulative, deceptive or illicit] practices unless he acted
other than in good faith."

425 U.S. at 206.

The scienter

requirement functions in part to protect good faith error.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 674-75 n.ll (Blackmun, J. dissenting).

-11-

See

also State v. Puckett, 6 Kan. App. 2d 688, 634 P.2d 144, 152
(1981), aff'd 230 Kan. 296, 640 P.2d 1198 (1982).
The reasoned decisions of the United States Supreme
Court are persuasive here as Utah's legislature intended:
Where a state statute is patterned after a federal
statute, the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and inferior federal courts, interpreting the
parent federal statute, are, even though they were
handed down after the adoption by the state of the
federal statute, most persuasive, particularly where
such interpretations are the only ones extant with
respect to the disputed words of the state statute.
75 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 335 (1974) (emphasis supplied).

See

also McKinlev, 667 P.2d at 17; Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111,
115 (Utah 1991) ("[t]he primary rule of statutory interpretation
is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve"); State v. Taylor,
82 Ariz. 289, 312 P.2d 162, 165-66 (1957) (subsequent
interpretation of federal statute was entitled to "great weight"
in construing state statute); Geraghty v. National Bank of
Commerce of Seattle, 8 Wash. 2d 437, 112 P.2d 846, 849 (1941);
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27.
Other states have correctly applied these principles in
construing their version of § 61-1-1.

See, e.g., Puckett, 634

P.2d at 154, (citing Hochfelder and acknowledging scienter
requirement); People v. Terranova, 38 Colo. App. 476, 563 P.2d
363, 365-66 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (acknowledging scienter is an
element, the court concluded:

"we look to Federal court
-12-

interpretation of Rule 10b-5 and the nature of the intent
required to sustain a violation of the rule").
Several states, however, have failed to acknowledge (or
were perhaps unaware of) the federal origin and meaning of the
Uniform Securities Act and its intent to harmonize state and
federal regulation.

See, e.g., People v. Cook, 89 Mich. App. 72,

279 N.W.2d 579 (1979) (Hochfelder and its progeny not mentioned);
People v. Johnson, 213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366 (1989);
People v. Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 433, N.E.2d 629, 633-34, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982); State v. Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322
N.W.2d 522, 525-27 (1982); State v. Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337
N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (1983); State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d
471, 474 (N.M. App. 1986); State v. Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665
P.2d 582, 585-86 (Ariz. App. 1983).

The government urges these

decisions which would permit sweeping, strict-liability
prosecutions.

The analysis applied in these opinions, however,

conflicts with Utah's legislative mandate.
First, of these seven jurisdictions, four appear not to
have the specific legislative directive found in Utah to construe
these laws in accordance with the related federal regulation.
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1800 et sea., Cal. Corp. Code
§ 25000 et sea. , 111. Rev. Stat. § 121*s-137.1 et sea., (language
broader than the Uniform Act), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-13B-1 et sea.
Only Michigan, Wisconsin and Nebraska have statutory provisions
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similar to § 61-1-27.

Decisions from two of these three

jurisdictions make no mention of federal law, apparently unaware
of federal precedent and the legislative intent.

See State v.

Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398 (1983); People v. Cook, 89
Mich. App. 72 279 N.W.2d 579 (1979).

Court analysis in the third

jurisdiction, Wisconsin, is equally flawed because it fails to
discern the controlling federal rule.

In State v. Temby, 108

Wis. 2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 525-27 (1982) the court inexplicably
cites Aaron for the proposition that intent to defraud is not an
element under "the federal statute dealing with fraudulent
securities transactions."

322 N.W.2d at 526 (emphasis supplied).

Apparently unaware of the many other federal provisions dealing
with fraudulent securities transactions, the Tembv court
overlooked the Aaron holding that Rule 10b-5, the model for the
provision at issue in Tembv, and here, requires scienter. Aaron,
446 U.S. at 691.
These cases are deficient in other ways.

For example,

State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (Ct. App. 1986),
relied in part on pre-Hochfelder federal cases which, to the
extent they did not require scienter, were overruled by
Hochfelder.

425 U.S. at 212-13.

In short, these opinions cannot

be reconciled with Utah's legislative intent.
§ 61-1-27; McKinlev, 667 P.2d at 17.
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See Utah Code Ann.

Yet, like those courts, the Court of Appeals deviates
from the federal pattern, focusing solely on the language of
§ 61-1-21 and on Mr. Larsen's use of the now-outmoded phrase
"specific intent" in his description of the scienter element.6
(Ct. App. Opinion at 13-14).

It never considered Utah's

legislative mandate, the related federal rule to which Utah
courts were intended to look, and never mentioned Hochfelder and
its progeny.

(Ct. App. Opinion at 13-14).

As a result, the

holding drives a wedge between Utah law and its federal model,
contributing to regulatory discord, contrary to the intent of §
61-1-1.

See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27.
The Court of Appeals' decision not only offends

legislative intent, it spawns grave uncertainty among Utah
businesses and investors who now face criminal conviction for a
good faith mistake.

Such concerns are evidenced by Hochfelder

where a national accounting firm was sued for securities fraud
violations under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

The plaintiff

claimed that accountants acted with "inexcusable negligence" by
conducting an audit that failed to reveal that the audited
company, a brokerage firm, had defrauded investors.
425 U.S. at 190 n.5.

Hochfelder,

The Hochfelder Court held that the

6

Mr. Larsen's requested jury instructions specified that
"the specific intent to defraud" had to be shown. (Defendants'
Requested Instruction No. 5). Mr. Larsen expressly cited
Hochfelder as authority for the intent element. (Defendants'
Requested Instruction No. 4). (Ct. App. Opinion at 13-14).
-15-

accountants' good faith was a defense and that negligence was
insufficient to impose liability.

Id. at 213-14.

If, however,

the Hochfelder accountants were sued in Utah for securities
fraud, as the Court of Appeals now defines it, the result would
be quiet different; they would have no "intent" defense even if
they acted reasonably and in good faith.

(Ct. App. Opinion at

13-14).
This example reveals important policy considerations
that support the scienter requirement in Hochfelder.

Investors

require concise, understandable reports to make informed
investment decisions.

If an accounting firm, for example, were

held criminally or civilly liable for its failure to discover and
disclose a material fact without proof of scienter, accounting
firms would be disinclined to provide reports unqualified in any
respect because of the daunting risk associated with their
representations or good faith oversight.

Additionally, investors

may no longer receive relevant information in digestible form as
overly cautious professionals and business people deluge
investors with insignificant records and "information" to avoid
criminal liability for failure to disclose something that could
possibly be material.

Some responsible individuals and entities

might find the risk unacceptable and stop providing investor
services altogether.
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These effects are avoided by the scienter requirement
that better protects investors.

The scienter rule sends clear

warning to those who would deceive or manipulate the investing
public7, while allowing securities-related businesses to provide
useful, appropriate information to investors with a degree of
assurance that they author their own future.

In contrast, the

Court of Appeals' holding exposes persons and entities involved
with securities—brokers, accountants, financial advisors and
others—to criminal prosecution for good-faith actions taken to
assist the investing public.

This result conflicts with the

purpose of the federal rule with which § 61-1-1 was intended to
harmonize.
In short, Section 61-1-1 must not be read in isolation,
as the Court of Appeals implies; it must be construed like Rule
10b-5 in harmony with its legislative and administrative genesis,
M

a history making clear that when the Commission adopted the

Rule, it was intended to apply only to activities that involved
scienter."

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212. The trial court's

refusal to instruct the jury concerning this element of the
offenses charged under § 61-1-1, as Mr. Larsen requested, is
reversible error.

State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1992).

This failure, which constitutes a violation of due process (see

7

The strict liability effect of the Court of Appeals holding
serves as no deterrent to a good faith mistake which, by its
nature, is perceived by the actor as lawful and harmless.
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Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 (1989); State v. Scott,
110 Wash. 2d 682, 757 P.2d 492, 496 (1988) (en banc)), Mcan never
be harmless error".
B.

Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061.

"Materiality" Under Securities Law is Not a Proper
Subject for Expert Opinion Testimony
1.

Introduction

The trial court permitted the State's expert witness,
Sherwood Cook, to testify, over objection,8 whether certain
alleged omissions by Mr. Larsen would be "material."

Mr. Cook

was displayed to the jury as an attorney admitted in both Utah
and Nevada, a former Utah securities regulation official and the
top securities administrator for Nevada—someone "familiar with
both the state and federal requirements of disclosure in limited
offerings." (Transcript vol. VI at 39, 42, Appendix E).

The

State posed hypothetical questions to Mr. Cook consisting of a
simplified rendition of the State's version of the case.
(Transcript Vol. VI at 45, 76-77, 85-86, 89-91, Appendix E).

The

trial court allowed Mr. Cook to opine, in essence, that "facts"
Mr. Larsen allegedly omitted from securities registration
disclosure documents were "material."

Mr. Cook, in effect,

rendered his expert opinion that Mr. Larsen was guilty.

8

Prior to trial, counsel for Mr. Larsen also submitted a
motion in limine to preclude opinion testimony from State
"securities experts" regarding whether alleged representations or
omissions met the legal standard of "materiality" for of a
securities prosecution under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). The
trial court did not rule.
-18-

(Transcript at 45, 76-77, 85-86, 89-91, Appendix E). 9

Relying

on invalid case authority, the Court of Appeals found the
testimony proper because it went to "an ultimate issue of fact."
(Ct. App. Opinion at 9-11).10
2.

This ruling is incorrect.

The Court of Appeals Disregarded the Correct
Analysis of Federal Securities Actions
Involving Expert Opinion and Relied on
Vacated Case Authority

Admission of Mr. Cook's testimony was error under the
analysis applied in federal securities cases, cases which pose
unique problems in defining the scope of proper expert testimony.
In the first of the leading decisions, Scop v. United States, 846
F.2d 135 (2d Cir.) modified on rehearing, 856 F.2d 5 (1988), the
defendant was convicted of federal securities fraud after the
government introduced opinion evidence through an SEC official
offered as an expert witness.

Taken as a whole, the expert

opinions expressed that the defendant's actions constituted
"manipulation" and "fraud" which were terms of the statute used
to charge the defendant.

Scopf 846 F.2d at 138.

The Scop court

9

Cook even testified, over objection, regarding his
supervision of another investigation of Mr. Larsen and others
involving a transaction which took place prior to the events
giving rise to this case. (Transcript Vol. VI at 47-52, Appendix
E).
10

One member of the panel of the Court of Appeals declined
to join in this section of the opinion. (Ct. App. Opinion at
15).
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found that the expert's use of statutory terms created an
improper legal conclusion:
Had Whitten [the witness] merely testified that
controlled buying and selling of the kind alleged here
can create artificial price levels to lure outside
investors, no sustainable objection could have been
made. Instead Whitten made no attempt to couch the
opinion testimony in even conclusory factual statements
but drew directly on the language of the statute and
accompanying regulations concerning "manipulation" and
"fraud." In essence, his opinions were legal
conclusions that were highly prejudicial and went well
beyond his province as an expert in securities trading.
Id. at 140.

Fear that the jury may have been mislead by such

testimony was heightened by the fact that statutory terms like
"manipulation" and "scheme to defraud" are not self-defining, but
have been the subject of diverse judicial interpretation,

^d. at

140-41.
The analysis in Scop is understandable and persuasive.
Like the expert opinion in Scop, Mr. Cook's testimony improperly
drew on language of the statute under which Mr. larsen was
charged —

§ 61-1-1.

(Transcript Vol. VI at 86, 89, 91; Utah

Code Ann. § 61-1-1).

Mr. Cook's opinions "were calculated to

invade the province of the court to determine the applicable law
and to instruct the jury as to that law."

JEd. at 140 citing

F.A.A. v. Landv, 705 F.2d 624, 622 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 464
U.S. 895 (1983); (Transcript Vol. VI at 89-91).

The Court of

Appeals failed to address this, remarking inexplicably that Mr.
Cook used the legal, statutory term "material" in a "factual"
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way.

(Ct. App. Opinion p. 10). Moreover, like the statutory

term "manipulation," disapproved for expert use in Scop,
"materiality," an element of the offense charged here, is not a
self-defining term.

Id.

Other securities cases confirm the problems associated
with use of "securities expert" testimony regarding legal
standards.

In Marx & Co,, Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d

505 (2d Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977), a
"securities expert" testified concerning what he thought the
contract phrase "best efforts" meant, and whether or not the
defendants there had used "best efforts." Id. at 509.

The

expert also testified that failure to issue a registration
statement within 70 days was proof that "best efforts" were not
used.

Id., at 510.

Finding this testimony an inadmissible legal

opinion concerning "reasonableness" of delay in registration, the
Marx court noted that securities fraud litigation presents a
special danger of abuse of expert witness testimony:

"With the

growth of intricate securities litigation . . . we must be
especially careful not to allow trials before juries to become
battles of paid advocates posing as experts on the respective
sides concerning matters of domestic law."

Id. at 511.

Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir.
1986) is another example.

There, the defendants attempted to

call as an expert witness an attorney who was former counsel for
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the defendants.

The attorney was to testify concerning whether

certain omitted information was "material" to an investment
decision.

The court held such testimony inadmissable because the

expert would in effect "testify in substantial part to the
meaning and applicability of the securities laws to the
transactions [at issue], giving his expert opinion on the
governing law."

.Id. at 368.

These cases reveal that while Mr. Cook's opinions were
not improper just because they went to an "ultimate issue," they
were improper because they are not "otherwise admissible" (Rule
704, Utah R. Evid.); they "were legal conclusions that were
highly prejudicial and went well beyond his province as an expert
in securities trading."

Scop, 846 F.2d at 140. n

Like the

testimony in Marx and Adalman, the objectionable portions of
Cook's testimony "did not concern practices in the securities
business on which [he] was qualified as an expert, but were

11

Both Marx and Adalman implicitly recognize the risk that
experts in areas of law have their own ideas not only as to what
the law requires, but what they think it should require. Often,
as here, this line is blurred in the mind of the witness, let
alone the juror's minds. These cases also recognize that
testimony of legal experts in securities fraud cases presents
significant conceptual problems which reach beyond securities
issues. See, e.g., Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359,
366 (4th Cir. 1986) ("If such experts are to testify to the
meaning and applicability of securities laws, what line is to be
drawn to exclude tort lawyers from offering their expert opinions
to the jury as to the meaning and applicability of laws governing
tort litigation. Examples of this sort could be multiplied
across the gamut of litigation").
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rather legal opinions as to the meaning of the . . . terms at
issue."

Marx at 509.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this authority and

relied instead on language from United States v. Leuben, 812 F.2d
179 (5th Cir. 1987), which, apparently unknown to the Court of
Appeals, was previously vacated.

See United States v. Leuben,

816 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987).12

Leuben, which involved

neither securities claims nor actual testimony, consists of two
reported decisions; the first, (the only one the Court of Appeals
cites) noted that the parties had simply assumed that the issue
of materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was a question of law,
while under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 it was an issue of fact.

812 F.2d

at 183. Relying on that assumption, the Leuben court held that
expert testimony on a "factual" issue of materiality was
permissible.

Id,. It also held that under FRE 403, the trial

court abused its discretion by permitting the government to put
on expert testimony on "materiality" while prohibiting similar
testimony by the defense. Jjd. at 184.
The second Leuben decision (overlooked by the Court of
Appeals), vacated its prior assumption that "materiality" was a
fact question and held that the issue correctly was one of law.

12

Stating that it was "persuaded by Leuben", the Court of
Appeals characterized the case as follows: "In Leuben, the Fifth
Circuit held that expert opinion on materiality was admissible as
being fact-oriented." (Ct. App. Opinion at 10).
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Leuben, 816 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987).

Given this

subsequent correction, Leuben plainly does not stand for the
proposition attributed to it by the Court of Appeals.

(Ct. App.

Opinion at 10).
More importantly, even if the analysis of the first
Leuben decision were valid, it would exclude Mr. Cook's
testimony.

The Leuben court characterized the proffered

testimony as "fact-oriented" because it would have been phrased
in terms of whether certain false statements would "'have the
capacity to influence' a loan officer, not the legal question of
whether the statements were 'material.'"
184.

Leuben, 812 F.2d at

Here, while the State's questions may have been

permissible, though very close to the line, Mr. Cook's responses
entered forbidden ground when he characterized information as
"material."

(Transcript Vol. VI at 76-77, 86-87, 89, 91). Thus,

even under Leuben, Cook's response, and the entire line of
questioning viewed as a whole, fell within the range of evidence
distinguished in Leuben as impermissible.
3.

Id.

The Court of Appeals Misapplied Rule 704

Rule 704 Utah R. Evid., modeled on the federal rule,
abolished the prohibition on opinion testimony going to an
"ultimate issue of fact."

Relying on Leuben, the Court of

Appeals apparently read Rule 704 to mean that opinion testimony
is admissible if it goes to an issue of ultimate fact because, by
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definition, it is not a legal conclusion.
493).

(Larsen, 828 P.2d at

This incorrect approach stands Rule 704 on its head.
Under Rule 704, evidence does not become admissible

because it goes to an ultimate fact; rather it cannot be excluded
only because it goes to an issue of ultimate fact.13

Testimony

going to an ultimate fact issue may be inadmissible for other
reasons; e.g., where, as here, that testimony embodies a legal
conclusion.

Scop, 846 F.2d at 139-40.

The intent of Rule 704 is to eliminate the labelling
problem created by the ultimate fact rule.

(See Rule 704, Utah

R. Evid. Advisory Committee Notes and Rule 704 Fed. R. Evid.
Advisory Committee Notes).

Yet the Court of Appeals' approach

replaces one label with another.

To say an issue is one of

ultimate fact and not a legal opinion simply states the result
and fails to clarify the basis for this determination.
"Materiality" in the context of a securities claim cannot be
neatly labelled as a legal or a fact issue; it is a conclusion
reached by applying an objective legal standard to a set of
facts.

Here, the analysis must focus on whether the expert

improperly supplants the judge as law giver and as the jury

13

"The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower
the bars so as to admit all opinions. . . . [Rule 403, 701 and
702] afford ample assurances against opinions which would merely
tell the jury what result to reach." Marx, 550 F.2d at 511 n.17,
citing Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rule 704, Fed. R.
Evid.
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instructor and on whether the opinions are "phrased in terms of
inadequately explored legal criteria."

Scop, 846 F.2d at 140.

Mr. Cook's testimony is not troublesome because he gave
evidence of a factual predicate for materiality.

The error

occurred when he was permitted in effect to instruct the jury
that in his opinion Mr. Larsen failed to disclose material facts;
in essence, that Mr. Larsen was guilty.
86, 89, 91).1A

(Transcript Vol. VI pp.

This is not proper, as the court explained in

14

This was worsened by portions of Cook's testimony that
were incomplete and misleading. At one point, Mr. Cook opined as
follows:
Q:
And if there is a change that the seller realizes
later on after he has used the document disclosing
the investment manager will function, what is the
proper way of dealing with that?
Mr. Keller:
Court:
A:

Objection, 702.

Overruled.

Investor should be informed of that change and
given a chance to get out of the investment.

(Transcript Vol. VI at 91-92). This question in effect asks Mr.
Cook if, in his opinion, an offeror has a legal duty to correct
or update offering materials. It is unclear whether the question
is limited to the offering period or whether the obligation is
absolute and continuing. While no Utah authority appears on this
issue, under federal securities law the duty to update or correct
is highly fact and time sensitive. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H.
Robbins Co., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds 607 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert, denied 446 U.S.
946 (1980). Mr. Cook stated a broad legal standard without
qualification. This kind of testimony not only constitutes a
legal conclusion, but because its correctness depends on facts
not presented by the evidence or even hypothetically, it should
have been excluded as an opinion "phrased in terms of
inadequately explored legal criteria." Scop, 846 F.2d at 140.
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Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 770 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir.
1985).

There, the trial court excluded proffered expert

testimony based on broad hypothetical questions that assumed
every relevant fact and that required the expert to give legal
opinions on the complex personal injury case, including proximate
cause.

Id. at 1311.

The court affirmed, noting that the

defendant was "asking his expert to tell the jury what result to
reach after having been told all of the facts possibly relevant
to the case." Id. at 1311. This case is no different.

By

admitting Cook's testimony, the trial court allowed the State's
expert to instruct the jury on its result after rehearsing the
facts of the State's case.

(Transcript Vol. VI at 76-77, 86-87,

89-91).
This error is compounded by Mr. Cook's status as an
attorney and securities regulator.

The forceful impact of his

ostensibly vast, specialized knowledge as an attorney in the
securities area prevented subsequent correction of his improper
testimony.

This was explained in Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805

(10th Cir. 1988).

In Specht, a 1983 Civil Rights action for

unlawful search, an attorney expert-witness for the plaintiff
considered "hypothetical" circumstances which, according to the
court, merely restated the plaintiffs' view of the evidence.

Id.

at 807. The attorney witness testified that as a constitutional
expert, he believed no consent had been given and that the search
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violated constitutional rights.

Ld. at 809. The Court of

Appeals reversed, finding that the witness supplanted both the
trial court and jury with the "array of legal conclusions."

Id.

The error was not harmless:
[g]iven the pervasive nature of this
testimony, we cannot conclude its admission
was harmless. There is a significant
difference between an attorney who states his
belief of what law should govern the case and
any other expert witness.
Id. at 808.
Like the attorney witness in Specht, Mr. Cook, an
attorney and securities regulator, "imbued with all the mystique
inherent in the title 'expert,'" heightened the "substantial
danger" that "the jury simply adopted the expert's conclusions
rather than making its own decision."

Jd. at 809.

The error of

admitting his testimony could not be corrected by crossexamination, rebuttal, or instruction as the Court of Appeals
suggests.

Jd.

See also United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384

(6th Cir. 1984) (testimony by bankruptcy judge concerning his
prior order and availability of interim fees not curable by
cross-examination); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550
F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir. 1977) (" [Compelling the opponent to
cross-examine to repair the damage is to invite disaster"); (Ct.
App. Opinion at 11). Admitting the testimony of the State's
attorney expert, Sherwood Cook, was improper and highly
prejudicial.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court should reverse the
decisions of the Court of Appeals and trial court and remand for
new trial.
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 900473-CA

C. Dean Larsen,
FILED
(February 7, 1992)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon
Attorneys:

Larry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dan and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

3efore Judges Bencn, Jackson, and Orme.
BENCH, Presiding Judge;
C. Dean Larsen appeals his conviction of eighteen counts of
securities fraud and tneft en the ground that the Office of the
Utah Attorney General rhe Attorney General) should have been
disqualified from tne case for a conflict of interest. Larsen
further asserts that formal investigation into wrongdoing was
prompted by disclosure cf confidential information from nis
attorney, and constituted an etnical violation. Larsen also
challenges tne admissibility cf opinion testimony by the State's
expert, the court's failure to prcnicit certain evidence, and its
refusal to give certain 3ury instructions. We affirm.

' .n ^ * O

In the early 1970s, C. Dean Larsen, an attorney with a
background in real estate that predated his law career, filed
articles of incorporation for what became a real estate
development company known as Granada, Inc. (Granada). Larsen
served as president cf Granada, a closely held corporation owned
cy him and memrers of nis family. According to Larsen, Granada
was M inactive11" during tne first few years after incorporation,

development. The projects ranged from housing developments and
apartments, to office buildings and a shopping center. The
projects were mostly concentrated along Utah's Wasatch Front at
first, but eventually they included real estate developments in
Arizona and Nevada. The first fifteen or twenty projects were
also very successful.
In simple terms, the capital for most of the projects was
provided by Larsen's law clients, typically doctors and dentists
for whom he had set up professional corporations and pension
plans. These clients invested retirement and pension monies in
various limited partnerships Larsen formed for real estate
development. Granada served as general partner in many of the
limited partnerships, and acted as manager in others when a
different general partner was named. In all, close to one
hundred real estate limited partnerships were organized.1
Granada had no employees during the first eight years after
its incorporation, but hired its first employee in 1979. More
employees were hired as Granada grew. Larsen said that, with
this growth, he spent more of his time with Granada, and less
time with his law practice. Larsen thereupon hired Brian Farr, a
recently licensed attorney.
Larsen claims he nired Farr as his own personal attorney to
advise him in representing his clients, thereby creating an
attorney-client relationship nested within another attorneyclient relationship. Althougn Larsen disputes that Farr was ever
an associate, except briefly, he referred several legal natters
to Farr to be performed on behalf of his clients. Larsen also
assigned Farr some legal work of a personal nature, such as a
parKing violation by an office venicle, pro Dono litigation, a
land sale, and preparing amendments to an unrelated familypartnership as new family memoers were born. Larsen further
assigned Farr some Granada-related projects, such as evictions
and a health plan.
Larsen supervised Farr's work throughout their working
"relationship.M
Farr reported the hours ne worked to Larsen, wno
tnen billed the clients. In turn, the clients paid Larsen, and
Larsen paid Farr for his services through an account m tr.e name
of Larsen's professional corporation. The Larsen-Farr
relationship lasted approximately four years.

1. Of these entities, only the limited partnerships known as The
Oaks, Ltd., Three Crowns, Baseline, and EFF Fund, Ltd., were
involved in the forty-two count amended information.

Larsen and Farr sometimes conferred together with clients.
According to Farr, during one such meeting, after setting up a
professional corporation and a pension plan for a doctor and his
wife, Larsen explained about certain reporting requirements that
were involved. Larsen informed the clients that an accountant, a
bank or a specialized pension accounting service could discharge
those duties. Farr asserted that Larsen discouraged the clients
from using a bank or an accountant, but recommended that they use
Professional Pension Services (PPS) , an entity that Larsen said
dealt exclusively with pension matters. Larsen also told the
clients that if they were to use PPS, they would like its liquid
mortgage fund because investments in the fund required no minimum
deposit and carried no penalty for early withdrawal. It appears
from the record that PPS was loaning the fund proceeds to
Granada-related projects.

Farr claimed

that

Larsen

failed,

m recommending

PPS,

to

disclose his former ownership of or continuing influence over
PPS. Farr believed these omissions could put the clients'
investments at risk. After the meeting, Farr contacted PPS at
the request of the clients for information about the liquid
mortgage fund. He learned that PPS did not have an offering
statement or any agreement regarding the use of the liquid
mortgage fund. Farr's concerns were further heightened when he
was unable to find any recorded trust deeds securing the leans.
After reviewing files at Granada and receiving additional
information from PPS, Farr discovered that these problems were
widespread.
Farr spoke to Larsen about what he had learned and perceived
to be a problem. Larsen assured him that the matter would be
resolved. Despite tnese assurances, notning was done. Farr
continued to press Larsen :cr a resolution and even volunteered
to handle the matter. Larsen re;ected tne offer, and hired
outside counsel to research any possible violations of state
securities laws. As a result cf the growing tension between
Larsen and Farr, their wcr< relaticnsnip was severed in 1382.~
Following the treaxup, Farr continued to be concerned about
the interests of former "clients," especially their investments
in Granada. As a result cf wnat he perceived to be ongoing
securities violations, Farr contacted Constance White cf the Vtan
Securities Division (Securities division; m 1933. Farr told
2. Larsen claims that
reason for the breakup
to the Utah Securities
view of Larsen7s claim
any meaningful sense.

Farr's failure to make partner was the
as well as his motive in reporting Larsen
Division, a rather telling statement m
that Farr was never even an associate m

White what he knew about Granada based on what he had seen, was
told, or had heard. White then turned the matter over to the
Securities Division staff for investigation. Later, in 1986,
Farr was employed by the Attorney General in the Health Division.
Concurrent with these events, Granada began to experience
serious cash flow shortages and its investments suffered. Larsen
claimed he believed Granada was solvent, and sought Securities
Division approval for a new mortgage fund offering by Granada.
In early 1987, Larsen learned that the figures he relied on were
inaccurate. The Securities Division told Larsen that Granada
would be placed in receivership if Granada did not petition for
bankruptcy. Granada then petitioned for bankruptcy in February
1987.
On October 19, 1988, the State filed a fifty-count criminal
complaint against Larsen. The complaint alleged that Larsen had
committed securities fraud and related acts of dishonesty in the
sale of securities. Larsen was bound over on forty-two counts
following a motion to amend and a lengthy preliminary hearing.
Larsen then moved to sever the trial into five parts in order to
more closely align the victims, dates, transactions, and entities
involved. The trial court granted the motion and Larsen went to
trial on the eighteen counts of securities fraud involving EFF
Fund, Ltd. (EFF Fund or EFF).
Larsen then moved to disqualify the Attorney General on the
ground that Farr's subsequent employment with the State, when
coupled with his previous disclosures to the Securities Division,
posed a conflict of interest that should have been imputed to the
entire office of the Attorney General. After a two-day hearing
in wnich Farr, Larsen, and White testified, the district court
denied the motion.
Larsen filed a written opposition to the ruling, and filed
an interlocutory appeal, ooth of which were denied. Before
trial, Larsen moved to prohibit testimony about any entities
other than EFF Fund, but the motion was denied. Larsen also
moved to prohibit inquiry into tne investigation by the
Securities Division that led to the eventual suspension of EFF.
That motion was deferred until trial. After a two-week trial, a
^ury found Larsen guilty of all eighteen counts.

DISQUALIFICATION
A.

Attorney-Client Relationship

Larsen argues that the Attorney General should have been
disqualified from prosecuting the case against him because Farr's
employment with the Health Division mandated disqualification
under the imputed conflict of interest rule. See Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 (1990). Larsen also contends that
his conviction should be reversed because Farr's disclosures to
the Securities Division violated certain ethical duties of
confidentiality owed to Larsen as a former client of Farr. The
threshold issue of both these arguments is whether an attorneyclient relationship existed. C£. Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d
887, 889 (Utah 1988)(threshold inquiry in legal malpractice is
whether an attorney-client relationship existed). The trial
court found that Farr was not Larsen's attorney except for a few
minor transactional matters unrelated to securities or the
criminal charges against him in this case, and denied Larsen's
motion to disqualify.
To prove that the trial court's findings of fact were
clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshal all evidence in
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings of fact." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,
199-200 (Utah 1990). If an appellant fails to marshal the
evidence, "the appellate court assumes that the record supports
the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case." id. at 199.
Larsen challenges several factual findings of the trial
court concerning the nature or extent of their professional
relationship,3 but admits ne "may have fallen somewhat short" in
3. Larsen challenges the following factual findings on appeal:
(1) that Farr was an associate of Larsen in the practice of law;
(2) that Farr occasionally performed legal work for Larsen
personally; (3) that the legal work involved minor transactions
unrelated to the matters or issues pending in this prosecution;
(4) tnat Farr did not represent Larsen while serving common
clients; (5) that, if an attorney client relationship existed
between Farr and Larsen, it was related only to minor
transactional matters, and not to any matter substantially
related to the prosecution; (6) that Farr was not general counsel
for Granada; (7) that Farr performed legal work for Granada in a
(continued..T)

marshaling the evidence. Larsen even goes so far as to suggest
that he was prevented from doing so because of page limitations
imposed upon him.4 Our insistence on compliance with the
marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting hypertechnical
adherence to form over substance. HA reviewing court is entitled
to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may
dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop. 753
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)(quoting Williamson v. Qpsahl. 92 111.
App. 3d 1087, 1089, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). The marshaling
requirement provides the appellate court the basis from which to
conduct a meaningful review of facts challenged on appeal. See
Wright v. Westside Nursery. 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah App.
1990)(the purpose of the marshaling requirement is to spare
appellate courts the onerous burden of combing through the record
in search of supporting factual matters).
Larsen argued only "selected evidence favorable to [his]
position," Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 739, 800 (Utah
1991) , without presenting any of the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings. Larsen's approach "does not begin to
meet the marshaling burden (he) must carry." Id. Because Larsen
failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and show how they are clearly erroneous, we affirm the
factual findings of the trial court that Farr was not Larsen's
personal attorney, except in a few minor transactional matters
unrelated to this prosecution.5
3. (...continued)
few minor matters; (3) that the work was unrelated to the matters
and issues pending in this prosecution; and (9) that Farr's
representation ceased prior to 1933.
4. Larsen was allowed to file an cverlength brief of 81 pages
after his request to file a 120-page orief was denied. The 31page brief was supplemented by five volumes of supporting addenda
that made extensive reference to memoranda of points and
authorities in the briefs filed below, thereby, circumventing any
size restrictions. Given this leeway, the argument that Larsen
was prevented from marshaling is somewhat disingenuous.
5. Larsen asserts that it was his suo^ective belief that Farr
was his personal attorney in all things, out fails to present any
evidence of conduct that would warrant an implied attorney-client
relationship. See, e.g.. Maraulies v. Uochurch, 696 P.2d 1195,
1200 (Utah 1985)(an attorney-client relationship was implied
where the law firm had represented a limited partnership in which
the would-be clients had invested); 3reuer-Harrison, Inc. v.
(continued... J

B.

Substantial Factual Relationship Test

Having affirmed the trial court's finding regarding the
limited nature of the attorney-client relationship between Farr
and Larsen, we review its decision to not disqualify the Attorney
General. The parties agree that the applicable standard
governing disqualification is set forth in Rule 1.10(b) of the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides as follows
(with our emphasis):
When a lawyer becomes associated with a
firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a
person in the same or a substantially
factually related matter in wnich that
lawyer, or tirm with which the lawyer has
associated, had previously represented a
client whose interests are materially adverse
to that person and about whom the lawyer had
acquired information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
Whether the matters in which Farr represented Larsen were
'•the same or substantially factually related" to the current case
is a critical factor in the disqualification calculus. The trial
court found that Farr's representation of Larsen was limited to a
handful of legal matters unrelated to the securities or criminal
charges against him.
On appeal, Larsen offered no argument that the matters in
which the trial court found Farr had represented him were the
same or substantially related to the matters for which
disqualification is new sougnt. Unless a substantial factual
relationship is shown cetween the natters, disqualification is
not required under the rule cecause tne most basic element is not
present. Our conclusion tnat there is no substantial
relationship is supported by the fact that Farr learned of the
perceived securities problems outside tne scope of tne legal
representation of Larsen expressly undertaken. When Farr
5. (...continued)
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, "27-23 (Utah App. 1990) (although an
attorney-client relationsnip may be i-.plied by the parties'
conduct, a would-be client's belief that a professional
relationship exists must have been reasonably induced by the
attorney's conduct). Cf. Atkinson v. IHC H O S P S . , Inc., 798 P.2d
733, 735 (Utah 1990)(courts consider who the attorney claimed to
have represented as snown by the pleadings and other documents;
the existence of an employment contract or retainer agreement;
and the parties' admissions about the relationship)".

confronted Larsen about the problems, Larsen rejected Farr's
offer to handle the matter and hired outside counsel.
Absent a substantial factual relationship between the former
and present matters, no attorney-client relationship can be
imposed on Farr with respect to this litigation, and "there could
be no conflict of interest created" by Farr's subsequent
employment with the Attorney General, Marcrulies v. Upchurch. 696
P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985), Accordingly, we conclude that,
inasmuch as disqualification of the Attorney General was not
mandated under Rule 1.10(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
allow the Attorney General to remain as counsel.
Id.
Further, we also reject Larsen's argument that the mere
appearance of impropriety is sufficient to overturn his
conviction.
In State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1990),
this court said that a criminal defendant "is not automatically
entitled to a reversal of his conviction" merely because of an
apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct.
Id. at
400.
If Farr violated any ethical rules, the "appropriate remedy
lies with the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar." Id.

III.

EXPERT OPINION

Larsen argues that the court erred in allowing the former
registration chief of the Securities Division, an attorney now
serving as a securities examiner in Nevada, to offer expert
opinion testimony concerning the "materiality" of information not
disclosed to investors. Larsen asserts that the opinion was
improper legal testimony, not factual testimony. Whether or not
the information was "material" is an element of securities
fraud. 6

6.

It is unlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directl/ or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances
under which they are nade, not
misleading; or

It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine
the suitability of expert testimony in a particular case, State
v. Clavton. 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982), and we will not
reverse that determination on appeal in the "absence of a clear
showing of abuse." Lamb v. Bancrart. 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah
1974). Expert testimony is suitable if it will "assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue . . . ." Utah R. Evid. 702. In general, expert testimony
is suitable in securities fraud cases because the technical
nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average
layman or a subject within common experience and would help the
jury understand the issues before them. See Dixon v. Stewart.
658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982).
Under Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, expert opinion
is "not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact".7 Despite the appropriateness of
expert testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 704 was not intended
to allow experts to give legal conclusions. See Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991)(citing Owen v. KerrMcGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)).
The danger of allowing expert opinion couched as a legal
standard is that "the jurors will turn to the expert, rather than
to the judge, for guidance on the applicable law." 3 Jack B.
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence. J 704[02].
See also First Sec. Bank v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253,
1258 (Utah 1989)(legal duty owed by trust deed trustee to trustor
is question of law to be determined by the court, and not
question of fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate
law); Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987) (attorney's
expert opinion as to effect of joint tenant's conveyance was
inadmissible statement of law). The determination of whether
expert opinion embraces an ultimate factual issue or constitutes
a legal conclusion is a difficult call because "[t]here is no
bright line between permissible questions under Rule 704 and

6.

(...continued)

(3) engage in any act,
practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989):
7. Black's Law Dictionary 1057 (6th ed. 1991) defines an
ultimate issue as "[tjhat question which must finally be answered
as, for-example, the defendant's negligence is the .ultimate issue
in a personal injury action."

those that call for overbroad legal responses."
P.2d at 1231.8

Davidson, 813

The distinction between a factual evidentiary showing of
materiality and impermissible opinion on the legal question of
materiality was underscored in United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d
179, 183 (5th Cir. 1987). In Lueben. the Fifth Circuit held that
expert opinion on materiality was admissible as being factoriented. The court reasoned that whether certain false
statements would have had Mthe capacity to influence" a loan
officer as a factual element of the government's case was
distinguishable from the question of whether the statements were
legally ••material." 1£. at 184. The government was required to
make an initial factual showing of materiality as an element of
its case. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court,
therefore, committed reversible error in not allowing expert
testimony since the defendant would have been entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal if the government was unable to
prove each element of its case. Id. at 185.
Although Lueben involved a prosecution for making false
statements in connection with a loan application and tax returns,
rather than securities violations, the case illustrates the
distinction between permissible fact-oriented questions as to
materiality and impermissible legal conclusions referred to in
the cases cited by Larsen.' Accordingly, we are persuaded by
Lueben that use of the term "material" may be admitted as
permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon review of the record,
we conclude that the expert in this case used the term "material"
in a factual sense.
3. See State v. Span. 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17-18, 26 n.l (Utah
1991)(arson investigator testified that fire was intentionally
set); American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271, 273
(Utah App. 1988)(expert could submit affidavit as to ultimate
issues of lack of good faith and fair dealing in suit for
tortious interference with business relations). See also Davis
v. Mason County. 927 F.2d 1473, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1991)(police
expert could testify that county sheriff was "reckless" in
failing to adequately tram his deputies, and that there was a
causal link between this recklessness and plamtiffs's m]uries) ;
United States v. Nixon. 918 F.2d 395, 905 (11th Cir. 1990)(police
detective could use the term "conspiracy," since testimony was
factual and not a legal conclusion).
9. See United States v. S C O P , 846 F.2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1988);
Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986); and
Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc.. 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir.

Since the State is required to prove all essential elements
of a crime, and materiality is an element of the offense charged
in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the
expert testimony. See State v. Flore2. 777 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah
1989)(state has a right to introduce evidence on every element).
Furthermore, any confusion that might have been created by the
casual use of the term "material" and its legal definition could
have been corrected with a jury instruction. See Conger v. Tel
Tech, Inc., 798 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Ortiz.
782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989).
IV.

MOTIONS IN LIMINE
A.

EFF Fund

Larsen brought a motion in limine to prohibit the State from
introducing testimony concerning any entities other than EFF Fund
on the ground that any such evidence was irrelevant to the
eighteen counts of securities fraud severed for trial. 10 The
State asserted that the evidence was relevant because: EFF had
been set up similarly to the other entities; Larsen had told
investors that EFF would be operated the same way as PPS; the
claim as to similarity was an inducement for investment; and the
partnerships all received money from EFF because of their
structural similarity.
The State also claimed that Larsen had promised the
investors that the loans were secured by promissory notes, but
that these documents were only partially completed or nonexistent. Although the trial court instructed the State that it
could not delve into specific acts of misconduct, the court
denied Larsen's motion, stating that the government was entitled
to pursue its theory of the case. On appeal, Larsen claims his
conviction should be reversed because of prejudicial error
inasmuch as the evidence was irrelevant and immaterial.
"Relevant evidence" is defined as that "evidence having a
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable" and is admissible unless excluded. Utah R. Evid. 401
"10. In particular, Larsen objected to trie State's inquiries into
how Granada raised money to acquire and develop properties; how
the liquid mortgage fund or its counterpart, the PPS fund,
operated; how EFF money was used; what limitations were imposed
on the fund; whether EFF was ever investigated; the significance
of certain portions of a registration statement; and which
nmnerties received monies from EFF.

and 402. See generally State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah
1986)• Rule 403 states that "relevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is found to be substantially outweighed by
the potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.11 Utah
R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). Thus, in determining whether
relevant evidence should be excluded, H[e]vidence that tends to
prove an element of the crime is admissible. Evidence which goes
to general disposition or that is unfairly prejudicial is not
admissible." State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App.
1989) .
The explanations given by the State regarding the relevance
of the other entities to EFF were cogent to the legal test of
relevance because they tended to make the existence of facts
concerning the alleged securities violations more or less
probable than without the evidence. The trial court had a legal
basis, therefore, to admit the evidence. See State v. Ramirez.
159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (1990).
Larsen does not challenge the merits of any of the reasons
given by the State as to relevance. Larsen's claim as to
relevance is based solely on the grounds that the EFF Fund, the
liquid mortgage fund, and the other partnerships were separate
entities. Larsen mistakenly asserts that the trial court's
severance of those claims bars any discussion of those entities.
The relevance of these other entities to the other charges, as
tne trial court pointed out, does not preclude their relevance to
the EFF Fund.
Larsen also made no argument on how evidence of the other
entities confused the issues or misled the jury. The trial
court's cautionary instruction prohibiting the State from delving
into other acts of misconduct adequately balanced the apparent
concerns for unfair prejudice. The trial court, therefore, did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
B.

Investigation by the Securities Division

Larsen also brought a motion in limine to prevent testimony
regarding an investigation of Granada by the Securities Division,
claiming that the evidence would be "highly prejudicial."
-Without holding a hearing or ruling on the motion, the trial
court indicated in a minute entry that consideration of the
matter would be deferred until trial. The testimony was later
admitted at trial over Larsen's objection. On appeal, Larsen
contends the testimony should have been excluded as impermissible
character evidence under Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

•• [I]n order to preserve a contention of
error in the admission of evidence for
appeal, a defendant must raise a timely
objection to the trial court in clear and
specific terms. Where there [is] no clear or
specific objection on the basis of character
evidence or unfair prejudice and the specific
ground for objection [is] not clear from the
context of the question or the testimony, the
theory cannot be raised on appeal."
State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986)(footnote
omitted).
Although Larsen claims he objected "at every opportunity at
trial," no Rule 404 character evidence objections were made.
Larsen objected to the State asking questions in improper form,
assuming facts not in evidence, asking for irrelevant and
immaterial evidence, and asking for evidence which, although
relevant, should have been excluded under Rule 403.
Larsen's objections as to form, relevance, materiality,
leading nature and so on do not call the court's attention to
impermissible character evidence and the theory is not clear from
the context. See State v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah),
cert, denied.
U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); Schreuder. 726
P. 2d at 1222. Because no proper objection was made, Larsen has
not preserved the issue for appeal and we do not address the
issue further.
V.

REMAINING ISSUES

A.

Specific Intent

Larsen argues that the trial court's refusal to give his
proposed jury instructions on specific intent was reversible
error. Although a criminal defendant is entitled to have the
jury instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any basis
in the evidence to support that theory, ]ury instructions should
not incorrectly or misleadmgly state the law. State v. Aly. 782
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989)).
The common law terms "general intent" and "specific intent"
have not been used in the Utah criminal code since substantive
amendments in 1973. See State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah
1987). See also Utah Code Ann. $ 76-2-102 (1990).
The Utah Code specifies wilfulness as the culpable mental

any provision of this chapter . . . or willfully violates any
rules or order under this chapter . . . shall upon conviction be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both." Utah Code Ann. $ 61-1-21 (1990)(emphasis
added). The trial court, therefore, properly instructed the ]ury
that the culpable mental state for the crime of securities fraud
is "willfulness," rather than specific intent as proposed by
Larsen. The court defined willfulness as follows:
You are instructed that a person engages in
conduct intentionally or with intent or
willfully, with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to the result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
The instruction on willfulness mirrors the statutory
definition of willfulness under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)
(1990). Moreover, because "willfully" is alternatively listed
with "intentionally" or "with intent," the instruction is not
inconsistent with State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976)
(crime of securities fraud does not require element of loss and
causal connection, since the crime is complete under section 611-1(1) if defendant intentionally employs any device, scheme or
artifice to defraud). Inasmuch as willfulness is the culpable
mental state, a separate instruction on specific intent was
unnecessary.
B.

Other Jury Instructions and Leading Questions

We have also reviewed the remaining issues raised on appeal
and deem them to be without merit. In our discretion, we do not
address them further. See State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 883
(Utah 1989).
VI.

CONCLUSION

Farr's subsequent employment with the Attorney General did
not mandate disqualification because there was no attorney-client
relationship between him and Larsen that would have created a
conflict of interest. Expert opinion on the issue of materiality
was admissible as fact-oriented testimony concerning an element
of the government's prima facie case. The trial court did not
.abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of entities other than
EFF Fund because of their relevance to the issues of securities
fraud. Larsen did not object to the character evidence
complained of, and thereby failed to preserve the issue for
appeal. The culpable mental state of securities fraud is
willfulness and the trial court's instruction on the element was
proper.

^^Accordingly, Larsen's conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

I CONCUR IN PARTS 11(A), IV(B), V(A) , AND V(B), AND OTHERWISE
CONCUR ONLY IN THE RESULT:

GregoxyrK. Orme, Judge

TabB

Tn'-C;- .-' •

,t

JUN 2 2 1090

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH,
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff,
v.
C. DEAN LARSEN,

Case No. 891900927
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant.
ooOoo

Pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
C. Dean Larsen, by and through his counsel of record, hereby
requests that the following jury instructions be given by the Court
in this case.
Further, the Defendant requests leave to offer such other
additional instructions as, during the course of the trial, become
appropriate.
1. The Court's usual instructions on the following subjects:
a.

Verdict/Juryfs responsibility.

b.

Province of the court.

c.

Province of the jury.

1

C01C47

INSTRUCTION NO. 4
The crimes charged in this case are serious crimes which
require proof of specific intent before the Defendant can be
convicted.

Specific intent, as the term implies, means more than

the general intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant willfully did an act which the law forbids, or willfully
failed to do an act which the law requires, purposely intending to
violate the law.

Such intent may be determined from all the facts

and circumstances surrounding the case.

1AT-

1

U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21.

2

1 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions,
§ 14.03 (3d ed. 1977).

3

Troutman v. U.S., 100 F.2d 628, 632-33 (10th Cir. 1939).

4

Sparrow v. U.S., 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968).

5

Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert.denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).

6

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).

7

U.S. v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11-12 (1976).

8

Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 422-23, 433-34 (1985).

9

State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976).

10

State v. Haas, 675 P.2d 673, 678 (Ariz. 1983).

11

U.S. v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 537 (3d Cir. 1978).

12

U.S. v. Payne, 474 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir. 1973).

001

13

U.S. v. Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580, 588 (D.C. Mass. 1959), affirmed
Danser v. U.S., 281 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1960).
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5
Under Utah law, a person engages in conduct "willfully" with
respect to the nature of his conduct

conduct,

or to a result of his

when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
Thus, an act is done "willfully" if done voluntarily and
intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the law
forbids; that is to say with bad purpose either to disobey or to
disregard the law.
An omission or a failure to act is done "willfully" if done
voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to fail
to do something the law requires; that is to say with bad purpose
either to disobey or to disregard the law.
In this case, the bad purpose would be the specific intent i^cf jjfl'
defraud.

*-

i\^

^

^h^

y

1

U.C.A. § 76-2-103(1).

2

1 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice &ilInstructions,
§ 14.06 (3d ed. 1977).

3

See citations from previous requested Instruction No. 4.

4

U.S. v. A. & P. Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958).

5

Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 250, 252, 264 (1952).

6

Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91, 101-107 (1945).

7

Hartzel v. U.S.. 322 U.S. 680, 686 (1944).

8

U.S. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 242-243 (1939).

9

Murdock v. U.S., 290 U.S. 389, 393-396 (1933).

10

Hagner v. U.S.,

285 U.S.

427,

429 (1932).

GQX^oJ

11

Ellis v. U.S.,

12

Marteney v. U.S., 218 F.2d 258, 263
cert.denied 348 U.S. 953 (1955).

206 U.S. 246, 257 (1906).
(10th Cir. 1954),

INSTRUCTION NO. 30
You are instructed that a representation made by the Defendant
in good faith constitutes a complete defense to a charge of
Securities Fraud. Thus, the Defendant is not guilty of Securities
Fraud if he had a good faith intention to carry out a promise or
representation at the time he made the promise or representation.
Even if the representation were false or based purely upon speculation and caused an investor to rely upon the representation as
true, it does not constitute Securities Fraud if the Defendant made
the representation in good faith.
Good faith, as commonly used, means a belief or state of mind
denoting honesty of purpose, or freedom from intention to defraud.
If the evidence in this case leaves you with a reasonable
doubt whether the Defendant made a representation in good faith,
then you should find the Defendant not guilty of Securities Fraud
in regard to that representation.

1

Sparrow v. U.S., 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968).

2

U.S. v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401, 1403 (10th Cir. 1988).

3

Frank v. U.S., 220 F.2d 559, 564-65 (10th Cir. 1955).

4

U.S. v. Bane, 583 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1978).

5

State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COINTY. STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

C. DEAN LARSEN,

CRIMINAL NO. 891900927

Defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 1

You are
charged by

instructed that
the Information

commission of

the defendant
which has

C» DEAN LARSExN1

been duly

SECURITIES FRAUD (18 COUNTS)

is

filed with the
The Information

alleges
COUNT 1
SECURITIES FRAUD. On or about January 7, 1986, in Salt Lake
County, Utah and in violation of Utah Code Ann., Section 61-11(2) and 61-1-21, the defendant, C. DEAN LARSEN, in connection
with the offer or sale of any security to Carles Flamand,
directly or indirectly, willfully made an untrue statement of a
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the
light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.

0CJ-X33

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are

instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah

a person commits securities fraud,
offer or

in

connection

with the

sale of any security, either directly or indirectly, he

willfully makes or causes to be
material

if,

fact

or

omits

to

made any

untrue statement

of a

state a material fact necessary in

order to make the statements made, in light
under which they were made, not misleading*

of the circumstances

INSTRUCTION NO.

If

You are instructed that a person engages in conduct
intentionally or with intent or willfully, with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to the result of his conduct, when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are
disproves

the

instructed that
culpable

UA

ignorance or mistake of fact which

mental

state

is

a

defense

to

any

prosecution for that crime.
The culpable

mental state for the crime of securities fraud

is "willfulness.M

lioXt'Jiwvi
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then a Certificate of Probable Cause should issue.
Because if a question is close enough, it would be
inherently unfair in our democratic society for someone
to be imprisoned for months and months and months, some
cases years, I suppose, for some Appellate Courts to deal
with problems.

We don't have that problem, fortunately,

in the State of Utah.

But nevertheless, that is a matter

that we have great concern about.

I believe that all

things considered, all of the points brought up, but
particularly the fact that this is a brand new statute,
and the statute, the main charging statute itself is not
very —

it is not very clear because it does not state

whether one should intentionally or willfully make the
statement but then confuses it by later on saying "The
punishment will be for one who willfully does it."

It

sets forth what the penalty will be.
Now, I do not believe —

I believe I followed

the State and 61-1-1 and combined it with 61-1-21 to find
willfulness and I think that is the correct
interpretation.

But there is an argument that could be

made, that since the charging statute itself mentioned
nothing, it should have been specific intent.

And that

alone, over this past weekend, has given me my greatest
concern.

And I feel that in all fairness that it is a

matter that must be resolved by the Appellate Court and

47

therefore I am going to grant the Petition for
Certificate of Probable Cause.
I grant the Certificate of Probable Cause,
which brings us to the next point of —

that is only part

of the battle won as far as the state is concerned.

Now,

the question is, is he a security risk and should there
be bail and, if so, how much?
MR. KELLER:
THE COURT:

May I address that, Your Honor?
You want to do it at this time, you

may proceed.
MR. KELLER:

Very good, Your Honor. Your

Honor, Mr. Larsen came to me in August of 1988. At that
time the Attorney General's Office investigation had been
several months, even years in occurrence, and asked me to
represent him.

He was charged October 19th of 1988. He

has made every single court appearance he has ever been
requested to make. He has been on Pretrial Release
through Pretrial Services and has never had a problem.
He has been trusted and he has discharged that trust
faithfully.

He is a family man with eight children,

lived in Utah all of his life. He is a very religious
man.

His family has been very supportive of him.

There

would be absolutely no reason in the world for him to
change a course of conduct that he has undergone for the
last two and a half years.
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Q

Are you professional licensed?

2

A

Yes, I am licensed with the State Bars of Utah

3

and Nevada.

4

Q

And where are you currently employed?

5

A

I am employed with the Secretary of State's

6

Office in Nevada as the Securities Administrator.

7

Q

How long have you been employed there?

8

A

Been there since '87.

9

Q

And where did you work before you came to the

10
11

Nevada Securities Commission in '87?
A

I worked with the Utah Securities Division

12

which is part of the Department of Business Regulation.

13

Now it is called the Department of Commerce.

14
15

Q

Did you have a title when you were working with

the Utah Securities Division?

16

A

Yes, sir.

17

Q

Had you had some training before you achieved

18

that title?

19

A

20

I was chief of registration.

When I was first hired by the State, I worked

as a securities examiner.

21

Q

What does a securities examiner do?

22

A

An examiner reviews the registration forms that

23

are filed, all the prospectuses that are part of

24

offerings.

25

Q

Tell the jury what the chief of registration
39

Q

Did you also touch upon disclosures with regard

to limited offerings or private placements?
A

Yes, various aspects of those.

For the most

part, limited offerings, the disclosure in a limited
offering, is established by me and the SEC in their
guidelines and regulations.

There are gaps in those

disclosure requirements, and that is where the committee
established some rules.
Q

Do you feel that you are familiar with both the

state and the federal requirements of disclosure in
limited offerings?
A

Yes, because we were examiners, we were

required to keep one eye on federal requirements and
another eye on the state requirements.
Q

What securities —

Before we leave the North

American Securities Administration Association, let me
ask you how long you have been associated with that
organization.
A

Since working with Utah.

Utah in 1982.
Q

So I started with

It has been eight years.

What seminars or special training might you

have had in the course of these eight years that helped
you in your employment?
A

Number of seminars.

seminars during the year.

The SEC sponsors several

The North American Securities
42

compilation of the disclosure that will go to an
investor.

That disclosure should be everything the

investor really should know or would consider important
in order to make an investment decision.
Q

And were you responsible to your employer to

determine the adequacy of those disclosure documents that
you reviewed?
A

Yes.

Q

And what are the types of things that you would

look for in your examination of prospectuses or Private
Placement Memorandums?
A

There is some basic disclosure that is required

under state requirements and the federal requirements.
There needs to be a disclosure about the owners, the
people that are putting the things together, that are
going to be running the business. You need to disclose
what their background is, what their qualifications are,
what problems they may have had in the past.
Q

Why is that important?

A

Well, because your investment decision is —

it

is important because the people that are going to be
running the operation are the people that are pretty much
going to dictate the success or failure of the operation.
So you need to know about those people.
Q

What else are you concerned with when you
45

the division if there is problems with the filings and it
is not accepted.

The division, if problems are

discovered, we then prepare a deficiency letter, as it is
called, and submit it to the correspondent.
Q

Now, turn, if you would please, to the fourth

page in the document and can you explain to the jury what
that document is.
A

This is the cover page of this prospectus. The

prospectus again is the document that is supposed to
contain all of the material disclosures that is intended
to go to investors.
Q

How large was the prospectus, do you remember?

A

Well, the prospectus, including exhibits,

actually was a couple of binders.
Q

Briefly, will you explain, if you would, what

determines what should be disclosed in the prospectus
side to be used in connection with the sale of securities
side?
A

In determining disclosures, there are specific

guidelines for what needs to be disclosed in every
offering and those are further established by state law
and, of course, federal law.

Beyond those established

guidelines, the person reviewing the registration
statement or prospectus would have to make a judgment
call as to whether or not under the circumstances
76

1

I additional disclosures need to be made.

2

I

3

| offering?

4

I

A

Yes.

5

I

Q

What is the standard if a new angle comes up,

6

| how do you determine whether or not that is disclosed in

7

J the prospectus?

8

I

9

Q

A

And do these disclosures vary from offering to

Well, again, you would look for any kind of

guidelines that may establish a precedent and then you

10

I just very carefully look at the operation and you

11

I determine whether or not there is a specific piece of

12

information that an investor would consider important in

13

J making a decision.

14

J is some information, then you insist it be disclosed.

15

I

16

I Who gets the prospectus?

17

J

18

I prospectus.

19

J suppose to contain all of the representations that the

20

I investor should receive and should be relied on in making

21

J an investment decision.

22

Q

A

Q

And then if you determine that there

What is the intended use of the prospectus?

The investor is supposed to receive the
This is all the representations or this is

So this document would contain those important

23

facts that you talked about earlier an investor should

24

know?

25

A

Yes, it should contain all of the material
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A

Yes.

Q

Are you familiar with those instruments of

security?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, we take for granted the prospectus's

language on this point, but investors were told words, in
fact, that promissory notes existed evidencing the debt
and then they were —
existed.

in fact, no such promissory notes

Do you have an opinion as to whether or not the

disclosure would be important to make in this prospectus?
A

Yes, it would.
MR. KELLER:

Objection.

Your Honor, may I

suggest that is immaterial to the issues before the
Court, the question as to whether or not it is important
in this prospectus.
THE COURT:
Q

Overruled.

He has answered.

(By Mr. Griffin) So this disclosure is proper

in this prospectus if we assume the facts?
A

Very proper, yes, essential.
THE COURT:
MR. GRIFFIN:

Is this a good time to break?
This is a good time to break,

Your Honor.
THE COURT: We will take our noon recess. We
are in recess until 1:30.
(At 12 noon, Court recessed until 1:30 p.m.)
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Exhibit F.

I am looking about four pages in. The pages

are numbered back there on the exhibit.

It is page No. 2

I want to call your attention to. And would you please
read the language in paragraph small b up at the top of
the page?
A

"The application to be submitted to the

Investment Manager by the Partnership shall include (if
not already in the Investment Manager's possession) at
least the following material.M
Q

Now, read the indented paragraph Roman numeral

four.
A

M

A form of note and trust deed or mortgage (or

amendment thereto in the case of an application for a
Material Amendment to an existing loan) containing the
proposed terms of the loan (or amendment)."
Q

Thank you.

Now, Mr. Cook, did you understand

in your review of the Private Placement Memorandum the
relationship that the investment manager had to EFF,
Ltd.?

Did you understand what the investment manager was

supposed to do?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, considering what you have just read, Mr.

Cook, if promissory notes never existed as represented in
the Private Placement Memorandum, do you have an idea as
to whether or not it would be proper to use this
84

memorandum to sell interest in EFF, Ltd. once the seller
knew that such notes did not exist?
MR. KELLER:
Honor.

Objection, it is leading, Your

Secondly, under Rule 702 it is not a subject

normally necessary for expert testimony.

As I previously

argued to the Court, it is inappropriate to ask such
question.

The jury can read the information and make its

own conclusion.
THE COURT:

Overruled, the witness may answer.

That may be answered yes or no, whether you have an
opinion.
THE WITNESS: Would you ask the question again?
Q

(By Mr. Griffin) Yes.

If promissory notes

never existed as represented in the Private Placement
Memorandum, do you have an opinion as to whether or not
it would be appropriate or proper to use this document in
selling investments in EFF, Ltd. once the seller knew
that notes didn't exist?
A

It would not be proper.

Q

If this memorandum were used to make initial

sales to investors and then subsequently the seller knew
that the promissory notes did not exist, what if anything
would be required before the seller could make additional
sales to those same investors?
MR. KELLER:

Objection, same basis.
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THE COURT:

Overruled.

You may answer.

THE WITNESS: When there is a material change
in the operation of the company, in most cases — well,
what should happen is that an amendment should be made to
the prospectus for future offerees.

But also, people who

have invested in the offering should be given a chance to
review the material change in the company and decide
whether or not they want to invest in that company.
Q

(By Mr. Griffin) And will you tell the Court,

please, whether or not amending this type of document is
a common or uncommon practice.
A

It is very common.

Q

Do you review those amendments from time to

time that take place in the securities industry?
A

Yes.

Q

And I believe that you testified, Mr. Cook,

that you do not ordinarily review Private Placement
Memorandums, but you do so on occasion?
A

Yes.

Q

And have you had an opportunity to review that

document more than once?
A

Yes, in preparation for the testimony, yes.

Q

Let's say, Mr. Cook, that you had an

opportunity to review this Private Placement Memorandum
before it was used in sales. And let's say you knew the
86

following about the offering:

Let's say that you knew

that Mr. Larsen had given to the general partner's wife
an interest in another partnership valued at
approximately $175,000 in connection with his undertaking
as a general partner.

And this would be to indemnify him

against losses he might incur as a general partner.

Do

you have an opinion as to whether or not that particular
fact situation should be disclosed?
MR. KELLER:

Objection.

Your Honor, may we

approach the bench.
THE COURT:

You may.

(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel.)
THE COURT:

The objection is sustained and you

may continue with your examination.
MR. GRIFFIN:
Q

Thank you, Your Honor.

(By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Cook, let's take a

situation where you have a limited partnership and there
is an asset such as an interest in another limited
partnership that is valued at approximately $175,000 that
is given to the general partner by another individual in
order to indemnify the general partner against his losses
that he might incur as general partner of that limited
partnership.

Now, do you have an opinion as to whether

or not in the offering documents those facts ought to be
87

PHOTOGRAPHER:

Yes, I understand the rules.

THE COURT: You may proceed.
MR. GRIFFIN:
Q

Thank you, Your Honor.

(By Mr. Griffin) Do you recollect the facts,

Mr. Cook?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

Do you have an opinion as to whether or not

those facts ought to be disclosed in an offering document
similar to that one?
A

Yes, I would consider that material information

that an investor would like to know.
Q
insiders.
A

You had talked earlier about compensation to
Does that fall in that category?
Yes, it is compensation but it also goes to

exactly what the general partners have at risk, whether
or not they have an incentive to put forth every effort
to make the operation successful.
Q

Now, assume also that you are examining a

Private Placement Memorandum, if you will, with regard to
a limited partnership.

And you uncover that the general

partner is actually not going to make the day-to-day
decisions in that limited partnership.

That will be

delegated to someone else to make the important decisions
and the day-to-day decisions. Would you want that to be
disclosed as well?
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A

Yes.

Again, that would be very important for

an investor to know.

The limited partners, or the

investors in a limited partnership look to the general
partner for the operation, the success of the company.
And the general partner is probably the most important
part of the limited partnership.

And if that general

partner is, in fact, not the true general partner, that
would be important for an investor to know.
Q

You said that you understood the role of Equity

Terra, the investment manager in this particular limited
partnership.
A

I have read the prospectus and I know what it

says about Equity Terra.
Q

Let me put this question to you.

Again, assume

that you are looking at a limited partnership and a
Private Placement Memorandum, and there was an investment
manager that was supposed to make sure that certain
criteria were fulfilled before loans were made from the
limited partnership funds. And assume, if you will, that
the investment manager never met, never operated, never
exercised his prerogative or made a recommendation, would
you want those facts disclosed in a disclosure document
to investors?
MR. KELLER:

Objection.

Your Honor, the

hypothetical is irrelevant to this particular case. I
90

would go further if the Court would allow me.
THE COURT:

You may come to the bench.

(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel.)
THE COURT:
Q

Objection is overruled.

(By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Cook, do you remember the

facts and the hypothetical situation?
A

Would you ask it again?

Q

Let's suppose you were examining the limited

partnership in which there is an investment manager that
will make certain recommendations as to how money is
going to be used from the limited partnership,
specifically regarding certain loan criteria.

And let's

assume also that the investment manager never functioned,
never made those recommendations and, in fact, ever met.
Would you want those facts disclosed in a disclosure
document to investors?
A

Yes, that would also be material.

It goes to

the essence of the operation and if there is a change in
what is disclosed to investors, that should be — that
information should be in the prospectus to begin with and
an investor should be informed of that.
Q

And if there is a change that the seller

realizes later on after he has used the document
disclosing the investment manager will function, what is
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the proper way of dealing with that?
MR. KELLER:
THE COURT:

Objection, 702.
Overruled.

THE WITNESS:

Investors should be informed of

that change and given a chance to get out of the
investment.
Q

(By Mr. Griffin) Now, will you pick up again

State's Exhibit 41-S and can you turn to page 44.

I want

to make sure you are at the right location, Mr. Cook.
You see the paragraph on the page that begins
"Furthermore"?
A

Yes.

Q

Would you read that sentence to the jury?

A

"Furthermore, trust deeds and other instruments

of the Existing Projects, Three of which have a negative
equity or a loss, will be put into the Collateral Pool
with similar instruments from any new Projects to which
Note proceeds are loaned."
Q

Now, this sentence discloses that there are

three projects, three existing projects that have a
negative equity or loss; is that correct?
A

Yes.
MR. KELLER:

leading.

Objection, Your Honor, that is

That is counsel's interpretation.
THE COURT:

Sustained.
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